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BILLS AND NoTES-1NDORSEMENTS-LIABIL1TY oF DRAWEE BANK ON FORGED 
!NDORSEMENT-H applied to the plaintiff credit corporation for a loan to 
finance a new auto dealership. In exchange for a note and contract pur-
portedly signed by H and his wife W, plaintiff issued a check payable to 
H and W. The check, after being indorsed, was paid by defendant, the 
drawee bank. The proceeds of the loan were used as planned, but the 
business subsequently failed at which time it was discovered that H had 
forged W's signature on the note, the contract and the check. Plaintiff 
sued to compel restoration of the amount of the check to his account. 
Held, for the defendant. The proceeds of the check went to the very per-
son intended by the drawer. Plaintiff's loss was a result of the forged note 
and contract, not the unauthorized indorsement. Commercial Credit Corp. 
v. Empire Trust Co., (W.D. Mo. 1957) 156 F. Supp. 599. 
The court recognized the universal rule that a drawee bank cannot 
charge a depositor's account for sums paid out on checks bearing forged 
indorsements, such payments being a violation of the bank's duty to pay 
only on the depositor's genuine order.1 Since the Negotiable Instruments 
Law specifically requires that if there be more than one payee all must 
indorse,2 forgery by one joint payee of the other's indorsement would 
ordinarily fall within the rule. Certain exceptions to the general proposi-
tion have developed, however, and the NIL recognizes that in some situa-
tions a party may be "precluded," or estopped from relying on the forgery.3 
One of these exceptions, apparently incorporated into the term "precluded," 
is the doctrine that the depositor has no right to restoration of funds 
which actually reach the person intended by the drawer to receive them.4 
This "person intended" test has been used primarily to prevent recovery 
in the "impostor" area where technically there is no forgery.5 But it also 
has been employed to raise an estoppel in actual forgery situations where 
1 BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 7th ed., §23, p. 442 (1948); 
BRITION, BILLS AND NOTES §142 (1943). See, e.g., Midland Savings & Loan Co. v. Trades-
men's Nat. Bank, (10th Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 686, cert. den. 287 U.S. 615 (1932); Los 
Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293 (1919). 
2NIL, §41. 
s NIL, §23. To the effect that the term "precluded" has generally been interpreted as 
synonymous with "estopped," see BEUTEL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 7th 
ed., §23, p. 455 (1948); 39 ALR. (2d) 625 at 646 (1955). 
4 BEUTEL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 7th ed., §23, p. 445 (1948); 39 
A.L.R. (2d) 625 at 649 (1955). 
5 The situation here should not be confused with the superficially similar "impostor" 
cases in which the drawer gives a check to the ·payee under a mistake as to the payee's 
identity. When the payee indorses the instrument, most, but not all, courts will hold that 
the indorsement is not a forgery. Thus, the resulting loss is thrown on the drawer on 
the ground that the person to whom the drawer gave the check was the person whom 
he intended to benefit by the instrument, though there may have been some error as to 
the payee's identity. See 29 .MICH. L. REv. 219 (1930) for a discussion of why the "impostor" 
doctrine will not be extended to cases where there is no mistake as to the true name of 
the forger. 
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the forger has turned over part or all of the proceeds to the single payee,o 
or where the funds are returned to the drawer without prejudicially delay-
ing detection of the forger.7 In such cases, the drawer clearly has suf-
fered no loss. The principal decision, relying on rather sparse authority,s 
extends the scope of the "person intended" test to hold that one payee, 
who forges his co-payee's indorsement, may be the person intended to 
receive the proceeds. While the facts before the court did not present as 
clear a case of no resulting loss as do the other situations where the "per-
son intended" doctrine has been employed, they are significantly different 
from those in the usual case allowing restitution from the drawee. In the 
more typical instance of forgery by one payee of his co-payee's indorse-
ment, both have a real interest in the proceeds. Thus, if one payee wrong-
fully receives the entire sum, the drawer's obligation to the other is not 
ended; and the depositor will have to pay twice to discharge a single 
indebtedness ff the bank is not forced to make restitution for its mistake. 
In the principal case, however, the non-signing co-payee was intended only 
as an accommodation maker of the note and contract and had no real 
interest in the proceeds which, as expected, went into the business con-
trolled solely by the wrongdoing husband. Whether or not the contract 
and note were proper, there could be no disappointed payee with an 
outstanding claim against the drawer. Having held that the funds reached 
the person and purpose intended, the court went on to state that, there-
fore, any loss to the drawer was caused by the forged note and contract 
and not the improper indorsement. Application of a proximate cause 
analysis was probably unnecessary to the decision, and the use of causa-
tion language beyond the negligence area may lead to confusion in factual 
settings otherwise clearly distinguishable. One such situation, where re-
covery is generally allowed, concerns the dishonest agent of the drawer who 
6 Coffin v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 374 Pa. 378, 97 A. (2d) 857 (1953); Sweeney 
v. Nat. City Bank of Troy, 263 App. Div. 418, 33 N.Y.S. (2d) 885 (1942); S. Yanowe &: Co. 
v. American Exch. Irving Trust Co., 226 App. Div. 530, 234 N.Y.S. 603 (1929); Beeson-
Moore Stave Co. v. Clark County Bank, 160 Ark. 385, 254 S.W. 667 (1923). See 39 A.L.R. 
(2d) 625 (1955). On the authority of Shipman v. Bank of State, 126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E. 
371 (1891), the funds paid over to the payee may have to be the identical funds received 
by the forger from the forged check in order to prevent full recovery by the drawer. 
7 Nat. Surety Corp. v. City Bank &: Trust Co., 248 Wis. 32, 20 N.W. (2d) 559 (1945); 
Andrews v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 107 Minn. 196, 117 N.W. 621 (1908), affd. 122 N.W. 
499 (1909). See 25 L.R.A. (n.s.) 996 (1910). Recovery was allowed where the deposit of 
the proceeds of the forged check in the drawer's account enabled the forger to cover up 
later forgeries, Stumpp v. Farmers Loan &: Trust Co., 109 Misc. 24, 178 N.Y.S. 811 (1919). 
s The only case cited by the court was Provident Savings Bank &: Trust Co. v. Fifth-
Third Union Trust Co., 43 Ohio App. 533, 183 N.E. 885 (1932), which in tum cited no 
authority for its decision. The Provident case is criticized in 32 MICH. L. REv. 261 (1933). 
Though also criticized, in 29 MICH. L. REv. 219 (1930), both Merchant's Nat. Bank v. 
Home Bldg. &: Sav. Assn., 180 Ark. 464, 22 S.W. (2d) 15 (1929), and Federal Land Bank 
v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 118 Neb. 489, 225 N.W. 471 (1929), would seem to support the 
principal decision and may go further since the proceeds were not used for the ultimate 
purpose intended. 
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forges the payee's indorsement to a c;4eck _i:5sued .in return .for .a forged 
note tendered by the agent.9 By applying a causation analysis, a court 
could incorrectly decide that the depositor's loss resulted from the forgery 
of the note and thus refuse recovery even though no objective contem-
plated by the drawer when the check was drawn has been fulfilled. Some 
courts have, however, permitted restitution to the depositor on facts 
similar to the principal case by looking only to the drawer's act of naming 
joint payees and finding that that act in itself was sufficient to show both 
payees were "intended" or, at least, that neither was intended to control the 
proceeds without the consent of the other.10 Undoµbtedly the court has 
taken advantage of unusual facts to extend the "person intended" test 
into a twilight zone where un_animity of opinion is unlikely, but it can-
not be said that it was without reason in so doing. 
John P. Williams, S.Ed. 
9 Provident Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 41 Ohio App. 261, 
179 N.E. 815 (1931); State v. Globe Indemnity Co., 222 Mo. App. 918, 9 S.W. (2d) 668 
(1928); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Mellon Nat. Bank, 276 Pa. 212, 119 A. 910 (1923); 
National Bank of Commerce v. Fish, 67 Okla. 102, 169 P. 1105 (1916). 
10 City Bank v. Hamilton Nat. Bank of Washington, (D.C. Cir. 1939) 108 F. (2d) 
588; Midland Savings & Loan Co. v. Tradesmen's Nat. Bank, note 1 supra. Cf. Citizens 
& Southern Nat. Bank v. New York Cas. Co., 84 Ga. App. 47, 65 S.E. (2d) 461 (1951); 
Farmers Union Agric. Credit Corp. v. Northwest Security Nat. Bank, 66 S.D. 276, 281 
N.W. 505 (1938). 
